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Abstract 
Rapid urbanisation is a major feature of developing countries. Some 2 billion more people are 
likely to become city residents in the next 30 years, yet urbanisation has received little 
attention in the modern development economics literature. This paper reviews theoretical and 
empirical work on the determinants and effects of urbanisation. This suggests that there are 
substantial productivity benefits from cities, although unregulated outcomes may well lead to 
excessive primacy as externalities and coordination failures inhibit decentralisation of 
economic activity. Policy should operate both by identifying and addressing these market 
failures, and by seeking to remove institutional obstacles to decentralisation. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The urban population of the developing world is projected to increase by some 2 billion in the 
next 30 years.  Urbanisation rates are strongly correlated with per capita income, productivity 
tends to be high in cities, and urban job creation is an important driver of economic growth.  But 
urbanisation is also one aspect of the widening spatial disparities that often accompany economic 
development, and many countries have urban structures dominated by their prime city.  While 
cities are highly productive, they create heavy demands for investments in infrastructure and 
accommodation, in the absence of which slums and informal settlements develop.  Urbanisation 
gives rise to numerous policy challenges both to make cities work better and to ensure that the 
overall city structure (the number and size distribution of cities) is as efficient as possible.  Cities 
require major public investments.  Some of these are in education, health and other public 
expenditures that are required in all locations, but others are for reasons specific to urban 
infrastructure.  Furthermore, there is no presumption that an unregulated free market pattern of 
urban development is socially efficient (even conditional upon appropriate levels of public 
investment).  Urban activity gives rise to many externalities, both positive and negative, so 
economic theory tells us that an unregulated outcome is inefficient.  We observe the grim 
conditions of developing mega-cities, and we know that in some developing countries the 
primate city takes a far larger share of population than was the case in much of the developed 
world at similar stages of development, (see Bairoch 1988 for an in-depth comparison of 
historical trends).  The performance of the urban sector also bears on overall economic growth.  
Much job creation – both in modern sector activities and in the informal sector – takes place in 
cities.  What determines the attractiveness of a location as a host for investment, and how can 
city environments be developed to maximise job creation?  Do ‘bad’ city structures impede 
overall growth? 
These concerns point to the need to have a robust understanding of the economics of 
cities, both theoretically and empirically.  Unfortunately, such an understanding does not exist.  
Work in development economics over the last several decades has been almost silent on the 
issue.  Some aspects of urbanisation have been approached in the contexts of migration and 
industrial development, but rarely focussing on the particularly urban issues that arise.  Urban 
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economics is, however, having a renaissance in the academic literature.1  There has been 
improvement in theoretical methods, as economic analysis steadily comes to do a better job at 
analysing economies of scale, and there have been empirical advances as larger data sets and 
better econometric tools are applied.  Some of this work has been applied to developing countries 
(most notably by Vernon Henderson from Brown University), although the developing country 
literature remains thin.   
The objective of this paper is to draw out the messages from this literature (analytical, 
and empirical, developed and developing country) that can inform thinking about cities in 
developing countries.  We seek to understand several broad issues.  The first is the benefits and 
the costs of cities.  Per capita income and productivity is generally higher in cities than 
elsewhere, partly because of productivity benefits of cities, and partly because of political access 
and rent seeking.  At the same time urban living is constrained by land availability and brings 
congestion and pollution costs.  How do these costs and benefits depend on urban scale, and how 
are they shaped by urban governance?  The second broad issue is the extent to which the private 
costs and benefits of cities diverge from social ones.  We will argue that cities are riddled with 
market failures.  These cause inefficiencies within cities, distort the city structure (the size and 
number of cities) and possibly also reduce the returns to job creation, impeding overall growth.  
Third, we offer some remarks about policy.  Researchers’ identification and quantification of 
particular sources of market failure and externality is generally not good enough to apply 
detailed policy targeting.  However, we argue that there is a tendency for cities to be too large 
(and for there to be too few of them), and that policy should seek to remove obstacles to 
decentralisation.  
We organise the material by first looking at the analytical work on costs and benefits of 
cities and associated market failures, and then turning to empirical studies.  Section 2 presents an 
overview of analytical approaches to urban development, and we will see that alternative theories 
give different predictions as to the real income benefits or costs of cities.  In section 3 we 
identify the main market failures associated with cities and the extent to which they lead cities to 
be larger or smaller than is efficient.  We then turn to the evidence, looking at both outcomes and 
the underlying mechanisms that support these outcomes.  In section 4 we look at evidence on 
                                                 
1   See for example the new Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics (Henderson and Thisse 2004).  Not one of 
the twenty chapters in this volume deals with developing country issues. 
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mechanisms.  What evidence is there on the relationship between productivity and city size?  Are 
there increasing returns to infrastructure investments, making it efficient to concentrate such 
investments in cities?  Alternatively, are cities supported by rent seeking forces and access to the 
political process?  Section 5 turns from mechanisms to outcomes.  What do we know about 
determinants of the urban size structure, and how does it change over time?  How does urban 
structure itself bear on the overall performance of an economy?  Finally, in section 6, we 
conclude with a discussion of policy issues. 
Before embarking on the literature, it is helpful to have a brief review of facts.  The basic 
numbers on urban populations and their possible development over the next decade are given in 
table 1.  The total population in cities with population of greater than 1 million is predicted to 
increase, between 2000 and 2015, by 5% in Europe and 19% in North America. In contrast, in 
LAC the predicted increase is 46%, in Asia it is 56%, and in Africa 96%, this following a near 
five-fold increase between 1975 and 2000.  During the development process, population 
becomes highly concentrated in ‘primate’ cities.  However, there is considerable evidence that 
the degree of primacy follows an inverse U-shape, as urban population – and modern sector 
activity more generally – disperses in more mature economies (see section 5.1 below). 
Cities offer higher income levels than average in the country.  The relationship between 
cities and productivity is well researched for developed countries (see section 4.1), and some 
numbers for developing countries are given in table 2.  This is based on sample data compiled by 
the UN-Habitat programme.  We see that per capita income in cities in Africa is 65% higher than 
the national average.  It is also the case that urban poverty rates are generally lower than rural 
rates (Kessides, 2004).  Yet at the same time cities support extremely high levels of both 
unemployment and informal sector activity.   
Finally, the creation of new jobs is overwhelmingly urban.  While data on job creation by 
location is hard to obtain, GDP growth by sector indicates that, for some regions, virtually all job 
creation taking place in activities that are generally urban based.
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TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF MAJOR AREAS BY TYPE OF SETTLEMENT AND SIZE OF URBAN SETTLEMENT, 
1975, 2000 AND 2015  
Type of settlement and number of  
Total population (millions)  Percentage distribution  Growth rate 
(percentage) 
Major area  inhabitants of urban settlement  1975  2000  2015  1975  2000  2015  1975-2000  2000-15  
Africa ............................ Total population  406 794  1 110  100.0  100.0 100.0  2.68  2.24 
Urban Population  102 295  503  25.2  37.2  45.3  4.23  3.56 
10 million or more  0 0   27  0.0 0.0  2.5  ..  .. 
5 million to 10 million  6 23  21  1.5 2.9  1.9  5.35  -0.63 
1 million to 5 million  12 64  123  3.0 8.1  11.1  6.67  4.35 
500,000 to 1 million  14 26  43  3.5 3.3  3.9  2.50  3.31 
Fewer than 500,000  70 181  288  17.3  22.9  25.9  3.80  3.08 
Rural areas  304 498 607  74.8 62.8  54.7  1.98  1.31 
Asia............................... Total population  2,397 3,672  4,371  100.0  100.0 100.0  1.71  1.16 
Urban Population  592 1 376  2 005  24.7  37.5  45.9  3.37  2.51 
10 million or more  31 136  214  1.3 3.7  4.9  5.90  3.01 
5 million to 10 million  47 87  162  1.9 2.4  3.7  2.50  4.12 
1 million to 5 million  147 318  466  6.2 8.7  10.7  3.08  2.55 
500,000 to 1 million  78 150  193  3.3 4.1  4.4  2.61  1.72 
Fewer than 500,000  289 684  969  12.0  18.6  22.2  3.45  2.32 
Rural areas  1,805 2,297  2,366  75.3 62.5  54.1  0.96  0.20 
Europe .......................... Total population  676 727 705  100.0  100.0 100.0  0.29  -0.21 
Urban Population  455 534  538  67.3  73.4  76.3  0.64  0.04 
10 million or more  0 0 0  0.0 0.0  0.0  ..  .. 
5 million to 10 million  37 32  32  5.4 4.4  4.6  -0.52  0.01 
1 million to 5 million  82 110  117  12.2  15.1  16.5  1.15  0.41 
500,000 to 1 million  46 49  48  6.8 6.7  6.8  0.22  -0.14 
Fewer than 500,000  290 344  341  42.9  47.2  48.4  0.67  -0.05 
Rural areas  221 193  167  32.7  26.6  23.7  -0.54  -0.98 
Latin America and the Caribbean    
    ............                        Total population  322 519  630  100.0  100.0 100.0  1.91  1.30 
Urban Population  198 391  507  61.4  75.4  80.5  2.73  1.73 
10 million or more  21 59  66  6.5 11.3  10.5  4.11  0.82 
5 million to 10 million  17 20  36  5.3 3.8  5.6  0.56  3.94 
1 million to 5 million  32 86  139  10.1  16.5  22.1  3.90  3.23 
500,000 to 1 million  18 39  45  5.5 7.5  7.2  3.14  1.00 
Fewer than 500,000  109 188  221  34.0  36.3  35.0  2.17  1.07 
Rural areas  124 127  123  38.6 24.6  19.5  0.10  -0.25 
Northern America......... Total population  243 314  356  100.0  100.0 100.0  1.02  0.83 
Urban Population  180 243  288  73.8  77.4  81.1  1.21  1.14 
10 million or more  16 30  32  6.5 9.5  9.1  2.54  0.53 
5 million to 10 million  16 7  13  6.4 2.2  3.7  -3.23  4.28 
1 million to 5 million  52 85  100  21.3  27.0  28.2  1.96  1.14 
500,000 to 1 million  17 26  23  7.0 8.4  6.5  1.73  -0.81 
Fewer than 500,000  79 95  119  32.6  30.3  33.4  0.73  1.50 
Rural areas  64 71  67  26.2  22.6  18.9  0.44  -0.37 
 
United Nations Population Division World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision
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Table 2:  Income and employment (1996 sample data) 
Region GDP per capita  City product Informal 
employment 
Unemployment 
rate 
Africa $441 $729 54% 23% 
Arab States $2,752 $3,170 65% 11% 
Asia Pacific $4,742 $6,182 33% 8% 
LAC $3,350 $3,226 39% 13% 
Transitional $2,541 $2,905 21% 9% 
All developing $2,670 $2,988 37% 12% 
HIC $22,501 $22,103 3% 8% 
http://www.unhabitat.org/programmes/guo/guo_analysis.asp 
 
 
 
2.   Urban economics  
 
Two broad theses are offered to explain urbanisation in developing countries, and in particular 
the role of the primate city.  The first, which we will refer to as ‘productivity’, is that there are 
various efficiency gains associated with clustering activity; firms and workers are attracted by 
these benefits.  The second, which we will refer to as ‘rent seeking’, is that city dwellers have 
preferential access to the political system, this enabling them to extract rents (relative to non-
urban dwellers).  Of course, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive; both operate to varying 
degrees in different countries and cities.  And pulling in the other direction there are costs 
associated with urban centres, these including transport and infrastructure costs, and externalities 
associated with congestion and pollution. 
 
2.1 Productivity:  
To set out a way of thinking about these issues, note that there are some functions that are 
inherently urban, or at least appear so in virtually all historical contexts.  These include 
government and central administration.  Other functions can potentially operate either in a city or 
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in smaller towns or villages.  These include distribution (markets, exchange, wholesale and retail 
activities) other services and manufacturing, although the size of a manufacturing plant places a 
lower limit on the size of a town or village that can accommodate it.  Our main question is; what 
determines the benefits of grouping such activities in an urban centre?2   
The first argument derives from ‘thick’ goods markets.  A system of exchange works 
better if it operates at a reasonable scale.  The variety of goods on offer is greater, search and 
travel costs are reduced, and competition is more intense.  Unsurprisingly then, ‘market towns’ 
develop in order to provide locations for trade.  Often these centres are home to local agricultural 
markets and so have important linkages with the surrounding rural economy.3 
The second urban advantage derives from ‘market access’.  Suppose that a manufacturing 
(or service) activity faces transport costs on the goods that it sells.  Other things being equal, the 
most profitable location for such a firm is close to a large mass of consumers – i.e. in an urban 
centre.  Models predict an amplification effect, so that manufacturing is drawn more than 
proportionately towards locations with good market access.  Physical geography and transport 
systems also come into play here; a port or river crossing will have better market access than a 
mountain-top.  These arguments extend to forward and backward linkages (perhaps better 
labelled as cost and demand linkages)4.  Many firms are engaged primarily in supplying other 
firms (rather than final consumers), and for such firms good market access means proximity to 
customer firms.  This is the backward or demand linkage – firms want to locate close to the 
sources of demand for their output.  But the converse of any backward linkage is a forward or 
cost linkage.  Firms that purchase the output of other firms will want to locate close to their 
supplier firms.  The combined effect of these demand and cost linkages can create a powerful 
force for agglomeration of activity.  We see it in dense networks of firms in related industries – 
engineering, electronics and even financial services, where firms that supply specialist financial 
skills locate near the big financial institutions, and these institutions benefit from access to the 
skills of the specialists. A developing country example is the surgical instruments cluster in 
Sialkot, Pakistan, where Nadvi (1999) identifies “over 20 stages in production, each requiring 
                                                 
2   Many of the arguments presented here are developed in more detail in Duranton and Puga (2004). 
3  The particular policy issues relating to small and intermediate urban centres and their potential role in regional and 
urban development are beyond the scope of this paper.  They are discussed in depth by Tacoli (2004). 
4   For a formal analysis see Fujita et al (1999).  An older tradition of development economics considered these 
linkage, although generally without recognising the importance to the argument of increasing returns to scale and 
associated market failures. 
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distinct skills and tools.  Surgical instrument making thus lends itself to an extensive division of 
labour and the process of large numbers of subcontractors in most process activities” (Nadvi, 
1999, p 87).   
Several other arguments also point to productivity benefits of cities.  Thick market effects 
arise in the context of labour markets.  Large pools of specialist workers and of the firms that use 
these skills benefit from better matching of skills with requirements, and also from risk sharing if 
there are firm or worker specific fluctuations in demand or supply.  Incentives to acquire skills 
are greater if the skills are sought by several firms, so the worker is less likely to be subject to the 
monopsony power of a single employer.  Labour turnover is one – but not the only mechanism – 
through which firms in a dense cluster of activity can benefit from the skills and knowledge of 
other firms.  There is considerable evidence of productivity spillovers between firms, as they are 
able to learn about and imitate the practises of other firms in the industry.  Silicon valley 
provides an example where knowledge exchange – formal and informal – is quite widespread.  
The knowledge may be about production methods, marketing skills, or simply knowledge about 
the location itself.  Thus, multinational firms tend to cluster in particular locations, partly 
because one firm, observing the success (or failure) of another, learns about the quality of the 
business environment in the location.  Hausman and Rodrik (2002) argue that very narrow 
patterns of specialisation in developing countries (for example, specialization in soccer ball 
production) arise as producers learn about the efficiency of a particular location for producing a 
particular good, this then becoming public knowledge.  
The final argument is to do with the provision of public goods.  It may be that there are 
increasing returns in provision of these goods.  For example, if a country is to build 100 miles of 
paved road, it may be efficient to build most of it joined together rather than scattered around.  In 
this case an ‘urban bias’ in public expenditure and provision may be an efficient allocation of 
resources (Arnott and Gersovitz 1986). 
These are distinct arguments, but all share several characteristics in common.  First, they 
are sources of spatially concentrated increasing returns to scale; there are efficiency gains from 
having things locate in the same place.  Second, all these arguments are potential drivers of 
cumulative causation.  People choose to set up activities in a location not because of the intrinsic 
merit of the location, but because other people have already done so, or are expected to.  Put 
differently, there are positive reciprocal externalities; my presence makes the city more attractive 
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to you, your presence makes it more attractive to me, and so on.  Furthermore, these mechanisms 
create ‘lock-in’ or ‘path-dependent’ development.  A city may be in the wrong place or an 
industry in the wrong city – but once there, it will not be profitable for any single producer to 
move away from the cluster. 
Before leaving the issue of the productivity benefits of cities, we should note that cities 
may have dynamic effects over and above the static effects that we have focused on here.  This 
dynamic effect will depend on the role that urban environments play in developing new products 
and processes.  Duranton and Puga (2001) argue that large diverse metropolitan areas play a role 
as a “nursery”.  These information rich environments allow firms to develop new products and 
processes.  However, once production becomes standardised, firms move out to cheaper 
specialised locations where they can benefit from localisation economies without the high 
diseconomies of the large urban city. Duranton and Puga (2001) provide evidence on firm births 
and relocations across French metropolitan areas that appear to be consistent with their theory.  
Could large diverse metropolitan areas be playing a similar role in developing countries? 
Clearly, the kind of R&D and innovation undertaken by developing country entrepreneurs differs 
from the way these terms are commonly used in the developed country context. Nevertheless, 
entrepreneurs in low-income countries must also engage in a process of innovation and learning. 
Their focus is on what Rodrik (2004, p. 9) calls cost discovery: “What is involved is not coming 
up with new products or processes, but discovering that a certain good, already well established 
in world markets, can be produced at home at low cost”. Rodrik suggest some developing 
country examples: cut flowers in Colombia, T-shirts in Bangladesh, soccer balls in Pakistan and 
software in India. The urban nature of these cost discovery processes remains largely 
unexplored.  However, Hausmann and Rodrik’s (2002) emphasis on the importance of tacit 
knowledge (the kind that cannot be easily codified in to blueprints) in the self discovery process 
strikes a chord with urban economists who have long seen such knowledge as playing a key role 
in the information spillovers that occur within cities. This suggests that, just as for their 
developed country counterparts, this process of cost discovery is likely to be significantly easier 
in the information rich environment of large diverse urban areas.   Unfortunately, theoretical and 
empirical work on these issues in a developing country context is not well developed and this is 
an important area for future work. 
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2.2  Rent seeking:   
The arguments above turned on real efficiency gains from the scale effects of urban centres.  
Other arguments are based on the idea that urban-rural differentials are due to transfer payments 
– urban dwellers benefit not by creating resources, but by extracting them from the rest of 
society.  These arguments have been developed by a number of researchers, including Lipton’s 
view of ‘urban bias’ (Lipton 1976, 1993) and Hoselitz’s ‘parasitic city’ (Nash 1977). 
The main mechanism here is political access.  For example, in many developing 
countries, starting a business, hiring and firing workers, registering property, enforcing contracts, 
getting credit, protecting investors and closing a business are subject to extensive regulation 
(World Bank 2005).  If business activity is extensively regulated by permits and licenses, then 
the probability of getting them may be enhanced by proximity to the administrative centre.  
Similar arguments may apply not just to firms, but also to households.  The political power of an 
urban proletariat may mean that the government acts to raise their real incomes.  This will attract 
workers to the town (see next sub-section), although its effect on employment is ambiguous; 
food subsidies may reduce the wages that firms need to pay, creating jobs, while minimum wage 
legislation will have the opposite effect.   
Transfers to urban dwellers can also occur through ‘biased’ public expenditure 
programmes, ranging from health through to transport.  Such programmes will tend to expand 
city population although, as we have noted, there may be efficiency gains from concentration of 
public expenditures in urban areas. The extent of these gains is an empirical matter, and the 
trade-off between such gains and spatial inequality is a normative concern. 
The urban bias argument is also made in terms of overall patterns of import protection 
and relative prices.  Import substituting governments have typically raised the prices of 
manufactures relative to agricultural goods, and this is sometimes argued to be a source of urban 
bias.  For present purposes however, it is important to keep separate the question of what is 
produced and where it is produced.  Supporting manufactures is supporting cities only if – for 
some other reason – manufactures are produced in cities. 
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2.3  Urban costs:   
The forces outlined above were to do with cities creating income (productivity effects) or 
transferring it (rent seeking).  However, cities also destroy income – they create costs for urban 
dwellers. 
One source of cost is the travel and commuting required by urban inhabitants.  A standard 
urban economics model assumes that jobs are clustered in one (or several) ‘central business 
districts’ to which workers have to commute.  This in turn generates a land rent gradient; rents 
are high in the centre where commuting costs are low, and low on the edge where commuting 
costs are high.  Commuting costs are the resource and time costs of running an urban transport 
system, which may be amplified by congestion costs.   
Conceptually, the costs outlined in the preceding paragraph are of three quite distinct 
types.  The first is the direct cost of uncongested commuting; a resource cost, but one that is not 
necessarily associated with any sort of market failure.  The second is the cost of paying urban 
rents.  This is a transfer payment, not a resource cost; it is paid by urban dwellers to urban 
landowners.  The third is the addition to commuting costs created by congestion, a negative 
reciprocal externality between those travelling within the city.  Other negative externalities also 
create costs for urban dwellers, most notably air and water pollution. 
A further source of cost, that has been the subject of much attention in the development 
literature, is that a city may attract a number of workers who are un- or under-employed.  The 
economics underlying this dual labour market structure is illuminated by the Harris-Todaro 
model.  The model supposes that the urban real wage is above real earnings in agriculture.  This 
may be because of institutional rigidities supporting a high urban wage (minimum wage 
legislation, union power or price support), or for efficiency wage reasons (wage reductions are 
unprofitable as they reduce the quality of labour working in the firm through nutritional, effort, 
or selection effects).  The high urban wage attracts an inflow labour to the city, in search of these 
‘formal sector’ jobs.  Given the number of such jobs, equilibrium migration is attained when the 
probability of a migrant getting a job is low enough that the expected wage from migration 
equals earnings in agriculture.  Migrants who fail to get a formal sector job are unemployed, or 
work for a much lower wage in the urban ‘informal sector’.5  The strength of the Harris-Todaro 
model is its simplicity, but this of course comes at the cost of abstracting from many important 
                                                 
5  See Becker and Morrison (1999) for extensive discussion of rural urban migration. 
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aspects of the problem.  The dual structure of formal and informal urban labour markets is 
complex, and rural-urban migration occurs for many reasons.  Nevertheless, the model makes the 
point that a possible cost of urbanisation is the associated development of a mass of low wage 
and low productivity urban labour.   
 
3.  Urban market failures 
 
Most of the arguments above are associated with some sort of market failure.  Consequently, 
there is no presumption that an unregulated outcome (even one in which public investments are 
being made efficiently according to a cost-benefit rule) will be efficient.  But what are the key 
market failures that should be borne in mind in thinking about city growth?  In this section we 
lay out some of the ingredients needed to think about the applied welfare economics of urban 
growth.  They suggest that an unregulated outcome will lead to the largest cities being over-
sized, essentially because firms are deterred from setting up in smaller cities both because they 
discount the future growth prospects of the city, and because they do not internalise the 
externalities they create in such cities.   
 
3.1 Determinants of city size. 
Suppose that at least some of the productivity effects of section 2.1 are present, as are increasing 
urban costs – specifically the commuting costs and urban rents of section 2.3.  The (private) 
profits earned by creating a job in a city are then illustrated by the line PR(n) on figure 1.6  
Employment in this particular city is denoted by n and measured on the horizontal axis.  The 
curve PR(n) (profit) is the value of output per worker minus the wage rate.  It is initially 
increasing because of the productivity advantages of increasing the scale of urban activity.  The 
rate of increase diminishes and then (possibly, and as illustrated) eventually turns down, because 
of increasing urban costs for which workers need to be compensated by higher nominal wages.  
The curve ASB(n) (average social benefit) gives the total real income created by the city, 
expressed per worker.  This is the value of the extra output created, net of costs incurred, in 
having workers in the city rather than in alternative employment (for example in agriculture).  
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MSB(n) is the marginal social benefit, derived from ASB(n) and necessarily intersecting it from 
above at the maximum of ASB(n), point m.  The gap between the social and private returns to 
creating a job, MSB(n) minus PR(n), is the value of the externalities created by an additional job.  
To the left of point a this externality is positive; that is, the productivity benefits created by a 
expanding urban employment exceed any external costs (such as congestion) associated with the 
expansion.  To the right population is so large that this is reversed.7   
The curves on figure 1 describe per worker returns in a single city.  Of course, there may 
be many such cities, each described by a figure such as this, although possibly with different 
shape curves reflecting both the natural advantages and the differing functional specialisation of 
each city.  Total urban population can therefore change either by moving along the horizontal 
axis for existing cities, or by growing new cities. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
6  For development and extensions of models on which this section is based see Henderson 1974, Helsley and 
Strange 1991, Black and Henderson 1999, Fujita, Krugman, Venables 1999, Duranton and Puga 2001, Henderson 
and Venables 2004. 
MSB
Figure 1: Private and social returns to city size
Population, n
ASB
a
PR(0)
Values per
worker 
em
Exter
nality
PR(n)
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These curves just summarise the basic technology of the way the city operates.  What 
economics do we learn from them?  The first point is that as city size changes so do the social 
returns to creating a job, MSB(n).  This means that we can define an optimal city size at which 
the social benefits are maximised.  This is at point m.   This point yields highest benefit per 
worker; it is efficient to grow each city to this point, and then expand overall urban population 
further by replicating cities rather than expanding this city further.8 
The second point is that the marginal social return exceeds the private return of job 
creation, MSB(n) > PR(n), for city sizes up to some point, a, and is then less.  As we have seen 
the difference between these curves is the net externality generated by an additional urban 
worker.  The point is that private incentives to create jobs, as determined by PR(n), are generally 
different from social incentives.   
Given these externalities, what outcomes can occur?  One possibility is that a set of 
institutions develop that internalise the market failures and lead to the efficient outcome.  As 
shown by the work of Henderson (1974), Henderson and Black (1999) this will occur if a single 
large property developer owns all the land in the city and is able to tax and/or subsidise 
inhabitants of the city.  It also occurs if there is local city government responsive to the 
incumbent population and with similar tax/ subsidy powers.  However, the way these institutions 
must work, if the outcome is to be efficient, is that competition between cities leads the large 
developer/ city government to subsidise workers to enter the city, with the cost of the subsidy 
being recouped through land rent.  While this may be a good model of the development of retail 
malls in the US, these are not institutions and policies that we typically see implemented in urban 
government, least of all in developing countries. 
If left to private market forces, what outcomes do we expect, and how large does each 
city become?  This is quite a difficult question to answer, depending critically on dynamics and 
the expectations of firms.  A naïve first answer is that the city will expand to point e on the 
figure.  The argument is that if a firm sets up in a new location (eg a secondary town) then it will 
not benefit from the productivity advantages of the cluster, so its profits will be close to PR(0).  
                                                                                                                                                             
7   Point m is to the right of the maximum of PR(n), because there are elements of urban costs (transport, rent) that 
increase with city size, but are not externalities.   
8  If later cities are somewhat less efficient – eg less natural advantage – and slow to grow, then it will be efficient to 
expand existing cities somewhat beyond this point.  
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Point e is constructed such that a firm in a city of size e has the same profits as a firm in a new 
city,  PR(e) = PR(0).   Point e is usually, although not necessarily to the right of point m, 
indicating that the free market outcome produces cities that are larger than is socially efficient.9 
This answer is somewhat naïve, because it is based on a firm failing to anticipate that the 
new city to which it moves might grow, moving along and up its PR(n) schedule.  At the other 
extreme we might suppose that the firm (rationally) expects to be followed by other firms, and 
perfectly anticipates returns moving along the PR(n) schedule.10  This will foster earlier 
formation of new cities and move city size towards the socially efficient level.  However, it will 
still not be efficient, because even this calculation is based on the path of private returns, PR(n), 
rather than the path of social returns, MSB(n).  It will tend to be the case that cities will be 
smaller than socially optimal if positive externalities are increasing over a very wide range of 
city sizes, and larger than socially optimal if these externalities turn down (and possibly become 
negative).11 
The conclusion so far is that, despite ambiguities turning on both the behaviour of firms 
and the precise nature of externalities, there is a likelihood that unregulated cities will be larger 
than socially optimal.  Essentially, firms are reluctant to move to a new city (relative to the 
efficient outcome), both because they might discount the future growth prospects of such a city, 
and because they do not internalise the positive externalities that they create. 
 
3.2  Other market failures 
The discussion above was couched in terms of productivity effects versus the costs of urban 
scale, and the extent to which these benefits and costs were associated with externalities.  How 
are the arguments modified if rent seeking behaviour or under-employed labour enters the 
picture? 
The effects of rent seeking behaviour turn on who gets the rents.  One possibility is that 
they accrue to the owners of firms in the primate city (via access to permits etc).  This provides 
an additional reason why it is difficult to establish firms in a new location, reinforcing the 
advantage of the primate city and increasing the likelihood that it is larger than would be 
efficient.  (In terms of figure 1 the PR(n) schedule is shifted up for the primate city, but not for 
                                                 
9  It is possible that point e is to left of point m, see Venables (2005). 
10   It may also need to borrow on efficient capital markets to cover short run losses. 
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other cities.  This shifts the point e to the right, since the comparison value, PR(0), is that for 
other cities).  
Alternatively, the rent may accrue to workers in the primate city, in which case firms are 
induced to leave the primate city in search of lower wage labour elsewhere.  However, the rent 
will attract workers for whom formal sector jobs are not available.  This is the core of the Harris-
Todaro model, in which such rent induces excess migration.  The model contains two market 
failures.  The wage is above the market clearing level, and there is excess migration and 
consequent urban employment.  In the simplest version of this model, it turns out that the 
relationship between equilibrium and optimum city employment levels is unaffected.  The 
private returns to job creation are reduced by the high wage and the social returns reduced by the 
additional employment, the two effects exactly cancelling out.  (The PR(n), and the MSB(n) 
schedules shift down by the same amount).  However, the city population is increased, because 
of the presence of the unemployed/ informal sector inhabitants, and we return to discussion of 
the informal sector in section 4.  Further work needs to be done integrating urban economists’ 
models of the city with the migration models of Harris-Todaro et al.  For a start on this 
programme of research see Brueckner (1990) and Brueckner and Zenou (1999). 
A number of further market failures are also likely to be important.  One that has 
attracted attention in the literature is the inefficiency of urban land markets.  If property rights 
over urban land are poorly defined then its use will be inefficient, and this may reduce urban 
densities, in turn increasing urban space requirements and commuting costs.  Thus, Maxwell 
(1995) reports that in 1992 56% of land in Kampala was devoted to agriculture, creating 
significant real income loss (see also Becker and Morrison 1999).  Investment climate surveys 
find that, in some countries, access to urban land (including costs of and barriers to buying and 
selling land) is a major obstacle to business activity (Kessides 2004). 
 
3.3  City size, job creation and growth 
Our attention so far has been primarily on the distribution of jobs between cities, given that the 
jobs are being created.  But a further implication of the analysis above is that the private returns 
to job creation are likely to be below the social returns, and certainly below the social returns that 
would accrue if cities were optimally sized.  This means that the presence of urban market 
                                                                                                                                                             
11  See Henderson and Venables (2004). 
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failures and associated inefficient city structures has the effect of depressing the returns to job 
creation.  If job creation is itself endogenous, this will slow down job creation and overall 
economic growth (see Henderson 2004).   
 
4.  Evidence: benefits and costs of urban size 
 
In figure 1, the costs and benefits of cities changed with city size so that the average social 
benefit peaked at an “optimal” city size (m). In addition, the existence of externalities means that 
the marginal social benefit MSB(n) does not coincide with the marginal private benefit PR(n) so 
that a free market economy will not necessarily reach this optimal city size.  In this section we 
consider two questions.  First, what do we know about the existence and magnitude of 
externalities?  Second how do the costs and benefits of cities change with city size?  We will 
start our review of the empirical literature by looking at productivity effects.   That is, we will 
see whether city size and structure impact on firm productivity.  The evidence shows that 
concentrations of economic activity do generally increase firm productivity, although different 
types of activity may be affected in different ways.  These productivity effects allow firms to pay 
higher wages, but the benefits to workers are offset by higher cost of living.  After reviewing the 
evidence on productivity effects, we will briefly consider what the literature has to say about 
these cost of living effects.  Finally, we will consider the literature that puts the two offsetting 
forces together to consider how real income changes with city size.  It turns out that the amount 
we know about each of these different effects and their relationship to city size decreases as we 
work through the list.  Thus, there is a large literature that attempts to identify the nature of 
production externalities – i.e. the impact of urban characteristics on firm productivity.  There is 
surprisingly little evidence on cost of living effects as a function of city size. Finally we know 
very little about the relationship between pollution and city size and even less on the sources of 
positive non-production externalities.  Let us now work through these questions in turn. 
 
4.1  Productivity 
The main areas of enquiry revolve around the scope, sources, and magnitudes of productivity 
effects (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004).   There has been relatively little consideration of the first 
two of these.  For geographical scope, data requirements mean that analysis is usually some 
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broadly defined metropolitan statistical area.  Similarly, there is little evidence on the temporal 
dimension with most authors focusing only on contemporary effects.  With regard to industrial 
scope, the issue is whether interaction is greater between firms within a particular sector, or 
across sectors.  Empirical work has usually resorted to a dichotomy and distinguished between 
two types of externalities: localisation and urbanisation.  Localisation economies exist if firms 
benefit from the presence of firms in the same industry.  Urbanisation economies exist if the 
benefit arises from just being in large urban areas.  Some authors, but not all, define urbanisation 
economies as arising from large diverse urban environments.   
Several stylised facts emerge from the developed country literature.  There is consistent 
evidence that productivity increases with city size. The survey by Rosenthal and Strange (2004, 
p. 2133) suggests that “[i]n sum, doubling city size seems to increase productivity by an amount 
that ranges from 3-8%”.  When studies attempt to distinguish between urbanisation and 
localisation economies the strength of these economies can vary substantially across industries.  
For example, higher tech and service activities appear to benefit from urbanisation economies 
while more standardised production appears to benefit from localisation economies.  Within the 
standardised production activities, some industries show very strong localisation externalities, 
while the affects for other industries are much weaker. Generally the most robust findings 
concern the existence of localisation economies.   
Most of the econometric evidence that is available refers to developed countries but, as 
we stated above, there is nascent literature on productivity effects in developing countries.  Table 
3 presents an overview of the available papers and highlights their findings. The econometric 
literature summarised in Table 3 is still in its infancy.  Our reading is that, with the exception of 
two of the studies on India, the findings for developing countries are broadly in line with those 
from developed countries. Unfortunately, in the particular case of India, the finding of 
localisation diseconomies in some sectors sits uneasily with that of significant spatial 
concentrations of particular industries reported in Lall et al (2004). Hopefully, further work on 
the detailed Indian data used in Lall et al (2003, 2004) will throw further light on this matter.  
Results for Brazil, China, Indonesia and Korea suggest that there is some evidence of 
urbanisation economies, but not in all industries. Interestingly, little of the developed or 
developing country literature considers how these externalities change with city size.  In fact, 
nearly all specifications are log-linear which implies constant elasticity of productivity with 
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respect to own industry concentration or diversity.  That is, the externalities created per worker 
are basically independent of city size.   
 
Table 3: Developing Country Evidence on Productivity Effects 
Country Paper Findings 
Brazil Henderson (1988)  Localisation 
China Chen (1996) Localisation economies for 2 out of 2 industries 
(machinery and food); does not consider urbanisation 
economies  
India Shukla (1996) Localisation and urbanisation economies; urbanisation 
stronger than localisation in 11 out of 13 industries 
 Mitra (2000) Urbanisation economies in 11 out of 17 industries; does 
not consider localisation economies. 
 Lall et al. (2003) Urbanisation: Food processing, textiles, leather, paper, 
chemical, basic metals, mechanical machinery, electrical  
Localisation diseconomies 
 Lall et al. (2004) No localisation or urbanisation 
Indonesia Henderson and 
Kuncoro (1996) 
Localisation: Apparel (inc. textiles), non-metallic minerals, 
machinery (inc transport and electrical)  
Urbanisation: Wood, furniture, publishing 
Korea Lee and Zang (1998)  Localisation not urbanisation economies (19 industries) 
 Henderson et al 
(2001) 
Localisation: Traditional, heavy, transport, machinery 
Urbanisation: High tech 
 
 
The extent of localisation economies can vary substantially across industries.  Figures 
reported in table 4 for Korea give some idea of this variation.  The second column shows the 
strength of localisation economies in different industries.  The coefficients give the elasticity of 
productivity in an industry with respect to own industry employment in the same metropolitan 
area.  Thus, for heavy industry a 1% increase in own industry employment increases productivity 
by 0.08 percent.  While this might not appear to be a large effect, the implication is that moving 
from a city with employment of 1,000 to a city with 10,000 would raise productivity by over 
70%.  The third column shows the strength of urbanisation economies by considering how 
productivity is affect by changes to an urban diversity index (calculated using the shares of 
different industries in each of the urban areas).  As the table shows, for most industries, there is 
no evidence of significant urbanisation economies.  However, for high tech industries, a one 
standard deviation increase in the diversity index increases productivity by almost 60 percent. 
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Table 4: Magnitude of Productivity effects for the Republic of Korea 
Industry Localisation economies Urbanisation economies 
Traditional (food, textiles, 
apparel, wood and paper products 
and furniture) 
0.021* N/A 
Heavy (basic and fabricated 
metals, chemicals and plastics) 
0.082* N/A 
Transport equipment 0.096* N/A 
Machinery and electrical 
machinery 
0.053* N/A 
High tech (computers, 
communication, television, radio 
and scientific instruments) 
0.056* 59.9* 
*significant at 5%.  See text for interpretation of coefficients. 
Source: Henderson, Lee and Lee (2001) 
 
These findings on urbanisation and localisation appear to be reflected in the pattern of economic 
activity across cities in developing countries.  Activities that are subject to diversification 
economies tend to be found in the largest cities.  Those that are subject to large localisation 
economies in a few medium size cities, while those subject to smaller localisation economies are 
less concentrated across a number of small size cities.  Thus Lall et al (2004) report that: “We 
find evidence of high spatial concentration for the Leather and Metals sectors, and moderate 
concentration in Food Products, Textiles, Mechanical Machinery and Computing and 
Electronics. Firms in the Paper Products and Chemicals sectors do not exhibit patterns of spatial 
concentration.”   
Evidence on localization is also provided by numerous cases studies of spatial clusters of 
firms.12 This literature makes it clear that the clustering of firms to benefit from some sort of 
agglomeration externalities is a widespread occurrence in developing countries. There are often 
strong market based input-output linkages between these firms and some evidence that the non-
market exchange of goods, information and people also occurs.  Many of these case studies also 
stress the importance of common cultural and social background in generating particular norms 
                                                 
12 Examples include: the Sinos Valley, Brazil (shoes); the Gamarra region of Lima, Peru (clothing); Guadalajara and 
Leon, Mexico (shoes); Eastlands, Kenya (garments); Kamukunji, Kenya (metal products); Ziwani, Kenya (vehicle 
repair); Lake Victoria (processed fish); Suame, Ghana (vehicle repair and metal work); Western Cape, South Africa 
(clothing); Tiruppur and Ludhiana, India (knitwear); Agra, India (knitwear) and Sialkot, Pakistan (surgical 
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of behaviour and of local private and public institutions that might reinforce those norms.  
However, identifying the true benefits to firms located in these clusters will involve much more 
analysis, focusing in particular on the identification of a set of firms outside the cluster that 
provide a suitable set of controls for comparison. (See Visser, 1999 for an attempt to move in 
that direction). For this reason, we do not consider this literature further here, but instead refer 
the interested reader to two special issues of World Development (Humphrey, 1995 and Schmitz 
and Nadvi, 1999) for further discussion. 
 
Productivity effects in the informal sector 
The evidence on agglomeration effects reported in Table 3 comes exclusively from data 
concerning the “formal” sector. How should the existence of a large pool of unemploymend/ 
underemployed workers (a la Harris-Todaro) change our thinking on agglomeration economies? 
It might be expected to reduce the benefits of city scale, yet there is no evidence that this is the 
case (see e.g. Au and Henderson (2004) results for China). There are two possible explanations. 
One, the existence of an informal sector drives up urban costs and crowds out the formal sector, 
but not fast enough to offset the positive productivity effects of increasing city size. The second 
possibility is that the informal sector also contributes to agglomeration economies. This 
possibility is ruled out by assumption in the Harris-Todaro model but at least some of the 
evidence emerging from developed countries suggests that this assumption is invalid. In 
particular, there is evidence that points to the existence of networks of small firms that benefit 
considerably from the productivity effects of the concentration of employment. In developing 
countries, authors such as Mukherjee (1990) emphasise the vitality of the informal sector. The 
informal sector often plays an important and visible role in the case study literature on clusters in 
developing countries. For example, Chari (2004) in his work on the knitwear cluster in Tiruppur 
paints a vivid picture of the journey taken by cotton thread through the various milling 
operations, dyeing firms and fabrication units. Formal and informal sectors play their part along 
the way as independently owned bullock carts shuttle yarn and knitted cloth between knitwear 
companies and fabrication units. To assume that no agglomeration externalities exist for 
Tiruppur’s informal sector and for informal firms more generally is surely inappropriate.  
                                                                                                                                                             
instruments).  Giuliani, Pietrobelli, and Rabellotti (2004) list a further forty examples from Latin America covering a 
diverse range of sectors including footwear, furniture, tiles, automotive industries and software.   
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Unfortunately, our reading of the econometric studies is that more formal evidence on this issue 
is simply unavailable.  Clearly, this is an important area for future work.  
 
4.2  Costs. 
There is surprisingly little systematic evidence about the effect of city size on living costs in 
developing countries.  Evidence from Latin America (see Thomas, 1980 and Henderson, 1988) 
finds that costs of urban living increase with city size.  Moving from a small urban area to a large 
urban area at least doubles the cost of living.  Richardson (1987) finds that the per family 
marginal investment cost is three times larger in urban than rural areas for four developing 
countries, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan.  The costs are even higher in the primate 
city.  Despite the relative paucity of evidence, it seems uncontroversial to assert that costs do rise 
with city size.  We could do with much more systematic evidence on exactly how these costs 
vary. 
What about the non-economic costs of living in cities?  Environmental issues would 
appear to be to the fore here.  The problem is, that while it is clear that these problems are worse 
in cities than in rural areas, it is not clear how these externalities change with city size.  Glaeser 
(1998) presents evidence for developed countries that suggest that levels of sulphur dioxide and 
ozone are not related to city size but particulate concentration increases with city size.  Shukla 
and Parikh (1992) suggest that sulphur dioxide has a slight tendency to increase with city size for 
developing countries.  They do not consider the impact on ozone levels.  Their results for 
particulates in less developed countries suggest an inverted-U, first rising then falling with city 
size.  It is very likely that this reflects the absence of industry or income controls (larger cities 
are richer and do less manufacturing, more services). 
 
4.3  Real incomes 
Real incomes give the difference between productivity effects and urban costs, and can be 
observed directly.  In two recent papers, Au and Henderson (2004a, 2004b) adopt this approach 
to the issue of the how costs and benefits change with city size.  The idea is to look directly at the 
impact of city size on real incomes (the difference between wages and cost of living).  The 
problem with this approach is that most institutional arrangements tend to leave the equilibrium 
city size somewhere to the right of the optimal point (i.e. on the down side of the ASB curve, as 
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discussed in section 2.1).  If that is the case, then looking at real wages as a function of city size 
should give us a negative relationship.  In order to identify the inverted-U shape it is necessary to 
have in the sample some cities that potentially are smaller than optimal.  However this would 
need a set of institutions that prevent cities from expanding beyond this size.  Au and Henderson 
(op. cit.) suggest that the recent migration restrictions in China provide just such a set of 
institutions.  They thus use data from China to directly study the relationship between real wages 
and city size.  
The results from these two papers, although preliminary, provide several insights which 
have important policy implications.  First, there is an inverted-U between real income and city 
size.  The optimal point on this inverted-U depends on what kind of activity is located in the city 
(which is not surprising given that, as discussed above, different economic activities have 
different production effects but we would not expect the relationship between costs and city scale 
to differ substantially across activities). Second, the exact level of optimal city size is very 
imprecisely determined.  This suggests that policy based on any notion of optimal city size is 
likely to face insurmountable difficulties in deciding what that optimal city size actually is.  
Third, at least from an economic viewpoint, it is much more costly to be under-sized than over-
sized.  This point is so important that it is worth quoting Henderson at length: “For [a city with a 
manufacturing to service ratio of 1], from a peak size of 1.17m if one subtracts 880,000 people, 
real output per worker falls by 16%; but, if one adds 880,000, it only falls by 6%. To get a 16% 
loss on the right side of the peak, one would need to increase employment size by 150% of its 
size at the peak. Real output per worker has a long flat portion near the peak, and real output per 
worker drops very slowly past the peak.” (Au and Henderson, 2004b, p. 27).  Finally, the very 
flat peak has implications for city sizes when workers are allowed to be mobile.  In particular, 
cities with slightly better amenities or market access could end up very large compared to cities 
with slightly worse amenities or market position.   
 
5. Evidence: urban structures, primacy and performance. 
 
The evidence that we present above has been based on the costs and benefits of city scale.  In 
addition to this, it is possible to look at the overall structure of cities in a country.  What 
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empirical regularities are there, and what factors shape this structure?  What are the implications 
of variations in structure, eg for growth and job creation? 
 
5.1  Urban primacy 
There is a substantial literature pointing to the dominance of the ‘primate’ city in developing 
countries.  Such cities are in some cases more dominant than were the largest cities in developed 
countries at a similar stage of development.  Their dominance tends to increase then decrease 
somewhat during the course of development (Williamson 1965, Shishido and Wheaton 1982). 
The determinants of primacy have been studied by a number of authors.  Ades and 
Glaeser (1995) present evidence that rent-seeking plays an important part in determining the 
degree of urban primacy.  They consider a cross section of 85 countries and examine a variety of 
variables that determine the degree of urban primacy.  They find that political factors play a 
more important role than economic factors.  Urban primacy is associated with high levels of 
political instability (as evidenced by coups, revolutions and strikes) and with centralised political 
systems (reflected in voting procedures and other political rights).  Thus, everything else equal, 
primate cities in unstable dictatorships are 50% larger than those in stable democracies.  
Economic factors also play a role.  High tariff barriers encourage urban primacy, possibly 
because they encourage domestic firms to focus on large domestic markets rather than foreign 
markets (see Krugman and Livas, 1996).  In contrast, intercity transport networks lead to less 
urban primacy, presumably because they allow firms to serve the large domestic market in the 
primate city from more remote locations.  These findings are reinforced by those of Henderson 
(2002).  He finds that, everything else equal, primate cities that are capital cities are 25 percent 
larger than if those primate cities that are not the centre of political power.  A second measure of 
the centralisation of political power (the share of central government in total non-defence 
government consumption) also has strong effects on primate city size.  Henderson (2002) does 
not consider external trade tariffs, but he does try a range of infrastructure measures.  Like Ades 
and Glaeser, he finds that dense road networks (the ratio of length of roads to national land) 
decrease primacy although the effect is insignificant.  The number of telephone lines per-capita 
also has a negative but insignificant effect.  One measure of infrastructure does have a negative 
significant impact on the size of the largest city: the density of waterways.  Taken together, the 
two papers provide some tentative evidence that investment in infrastructure could play a 
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considerable part in reducing urban primacy.  The most robust finding is that political 
decentralisation goes hand in hand with urban decentralisation, presumably because of the 
reduced incentive to locate in the primate city in order to engage in rent-seeking behaviour. 
Two key question issues remain unresolved.  First, neither of these empirical papers offer 
a serious alternative hypothesis for the primacy of a particular city in the absence of rent seeking.  
Such alternatives are available from the theoretical literature; for example, Puga (1996) uses a 
simple new economic geography to explain urban primacy as a function of transport costs and 
the elasticity of labour supply from the agricultural to the urban production sectors.  Further 
empirical work testing such alternative hypotheses against those based on rent-seeking behaviour 
are needed before we are able to assess the extent to which primacy is explained by these 
competing hypothesis.  The second unresolved issue relates to the impact of this urban primacy 
on development and growth. 
 
5.2  Urban primacy and economic growth 
Henderson (2003) provides some preliminary evidence on this second issue.  He shows, as in 
Williamson (1965), that excessive urban primacy has a significant negative impact on economic 
growth.  The relationship between primacy and growth is inverse-U shaped, so that negative 
effects arise when a primate city is above its optimal size.  However, as we discussed in Section 
4.3, optimal city sizes are very hard to identify.  Indeed, in terms of current economic 
performance, the results from Au and Henderson (2004) suggest that even being substantially 
above optimal size only has a fairly small effect on productivity.  Thus, it is unclear where these 
findings of a significant negative impact on growth are coming from unless primate cities really 
are very large indeed relative to their optimal size.  This is possible, but there is also another 
possibility which down-plays the causal nature of the link between primacy and economic 
growth.  Recall, that in section 5.1 we suggested that the evidence points to a rent seeking as an 
important determinant of urban primacy.  If urban primacy is largely caused by rent-seeking 
behaviour, then it may be that both slow growth and urban primacy are the negative 
consequences of that rent-seeking behaviour.  Determining whether the relationship between 
urban primacy and poor economic growth is a matter of correlation or causation is very 
important. If the underlying problem driving both primacy and slow growth is rent seeking 
behaviour then a policy targeted at reducing the extent of urban-primacy is unlikely to have any 
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substantial impact on growth.  Such a policy could even have a negative impact if it involves 
relocating productive economic sectors away from the primate city, because these productive 
activities may no longer be able to benefit from the urbanisation economies that they enjoyed in 
the large urban environment.  Au and Henderson’s (2004) results on the high costs of undersized 
cities urges particular caution when considering policies to force de-concentration of productive 
activities from primate cities.  This said, there are circumstances where the right policy may well 
be aimed at de-concentration an issue which we discuss further in Section 6.2 below. 
 
6. Some policy implications 
 
We have argued that cities contain many market failures, and that there are many reasons to 
expect that unregulated outcomes will be socially inefficient.  The failures have two sorts of 
effects.  One is that – given a size distribution of cities – they impede the efficiency with which 
cities operate.  The other is that they distort the size structure of cities sometimes, possibly 
contributing to excess primacy.  Policy responses can also be thought of at two different levels.  
One is to identify the market failures and target policies to overcome them – the classical 
instruments being taxes, subsidies, or regulation.  The other is to identify the broader institutional 
failures that prevent private agents (for example firms and city governments) from acting to 
internalise at least some of the externalities.  We discuss some of the difficulties and 
opportunities for each of these approaches in turn.   
 
6.1  Identifying market failures 
As we have seen, there are many types of externalities, both positive and negative, that may be 
important for policy decisions in the urban context.  If these are to be targeted by policy actions, 
they must first be accurately identified and quantified.  While a large body of literature now finds 
evidence of positive externalities in the relationship between city size and productivity, a number 
of issues remain.  One is addressing adequately the heterogeneity of both workers and firms.  If 
intrinsically productive workers or firms tend to choose to locate in urban areas, then 
econometric estimates would tend to overestimate the size of productivity externalities.  Having 
more detailed data on firms allows us to control for some of these differences, and thus to get a 
more accurate estimate of productivity effects.  Analysis for France by Combes et al (2004) 
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shows that this selective sorting substantially reduces, but does not eliminate, estimates of the 
magnitude of productivity externalities. 
We know relatively little about production externalities in the service sector.  This is 
clearly important in the developing country context given the role wholesale and retail play in 
the economies of developing country cities.  The approaches adopted for manufacturing are 
applicable to services although the difficulties with measuring productivity for service sectors 
may point to a focus on employment rather than productivity.  Evidence from developed 
countries suggests that urbanisation economies may be more important than localisation 
economies for service sector activity (Henderson et al, 1995).  We know relatively little about 
dynamic externalities, i.e. the impact of urbanisation or localisation in the long run.  Examples 
abound, but we lack systematic evidence.  A starting point would be to examine firm life cycles 
along the lines followed by Duranton and Puga (2001).  If the incubator role of cities in terms of 
cost discovery is important we would expect to see large numbers of start ups in diverse urban 
environments, with more production moving out to lower cost locations once production 
becomes more standardised.  This is an area where more systematic case studies would also help. 
More systematic case studies may also be needed to examine the production externalities that 
occur in the informal sector (see also the discussion in box 2).  There is a huge literature on the 
economics of the informal sector, but we have found little evidence of any consideration of the 
existence of production externalities.  The underlying assumption appears to be that production 
externalities in the informal sector are zero or negative.  This is a crucial assumption and has 
significant implications for whether, say, restricting urban-rural migration and focusing on rural-
urban balance is a sensible policy approach for dealing with urban primacy. 
On the other side of the equation are the negative externalities of congestion and 
pollution.  These may well be easier to observe and measure than the positive production 
externalities discussed above – delays can be counted and pollutants measured and evaluated.  
This may prove fortunate as well known examples, such as Mexico City, suggest that these costs 
may be particularly acute in some cities. 
What does this suggest for the design of targeted policy?  Fairly clear recommendations 
can be made in some cases.  For example, if we have evidence that a particular heavily polluting 
industry tends to benefit from localisation rather than urbanisation economies then it should be 
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located in a large diverse city.  If urban land markets do not work, then reform to make them 
function is desirable. 
In other cases it is much more difficult.  Clearly, it is neither feasible nor desirable to 
seek to identify and to subsidise every possible source of positive externality in production.  The 
theory of the second best warns us to the dangers of piecemeal policy – the possibility that when 
there are multiple distortions correcting some, but not all of them, does not necessarily raise 
welfare.  And notions of targeting city size as a whole are fraught with danger.  At least 
conceptually, it should be possible to identify an optimal (or efficient) city size.  The available 
evidence suggests that this is extremely unlikely to provide a good policy target in practice.  This 
reflects that fact that there are very large margins of errors associated with attempting to identify 
optimal city size.  Theoretical and empirical evidence does suggest that, in most institutional 
contexts, moving towards the unknown optimal city size would involve attempts to constrain the 
size of the larger cities or facilitate the growth of new cities.  The key problem with this as a 
policy objective is that available evidence suggests that, at least from an economic perspective, 
being oversized is much less costly than being undersized.  Work on China suggests that getting 
it wrong and restricting city size too much can lead to fairly large economic losses.  Given the 
uncertainty involved, limiting city size on the basis that the optimal city size may be smaller 
would appear to be a highly risky policy objective.   
 
6.2  Institutions to promote efficiency 
Standing back from the detail, one of the main issues that we have identified is the disadvantage 
that a firm might face in locating outside an existing centre of activity, and the consequent bias 
towards primacy that this creates.  We pointed to different factors creating this disadvantage.  
One was the existence of institutional structures that encourage the rent-seeking and thereby 
support large primate cities.  Another was uncertainty about the future growth prospects of 
secondary cities – an ‘isolation paradox’ or coordination failure deterring firms from relocating.  
A third arises in public finance, as developing cities typically require large public investments, 
yet lack both the tax base and the ability to borrow to finance such investments.  We also saw 
how poor inter-city infrastructure and restrictive international trade policy tend to promote 
primacy. 
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These are issues that can, potentially, be addressed by institutional reform.  Deregulation 
and measures against corruption can reduce the attractiveness of the primate city as a source of 
rents.  City governments can be equipped with powers and incentives to plan and finance 
development in cooperation with the private sectors; while devolving borrowing powers clearly 
has risks, attention needs to be paid to designing mechanisms that can fund the required 
investments.  National infrastructure policy can be shaped with a view to facilitating 
deconcentration. 
An interesting example of the effectiveness of alternative policies is provided by the case 
of Korea (see Henderson, Lee and Lee 2001) in which activity was deconcentrated away from 
the Seoul region. Initial heavy concentration in the Seoul region had been encouraged by state 
regulation and by poor infrastructure investments in outlying districts.  In the early and mid 
1970s policies were introduced that included financial incentives for relocating firms, direct 
relocation orders and public construction of infrastructure parks.  They had limited success, only 
encouraging decentralisation from central Seoul to areas within 45 minutes drive from the city.  
In the early 1980s policy turned to wider deregulation, reducing the need to be close to Seoul to 
deal with government.  In addition, there was a massive investment drive to improve 
infrastructure and communications to a designated set of primary and secondary cities.  This 
combination was successful in reducing the share of manufacturing employment in the 3 largest 
urban areas from 44% in 1983 to 28% in 1993. 
In conclusion then, policy design needs to be thought through at two levels.  One is 
identifying the market failures and, in some cases, using targeted micro-economic policy to 
address them.  The other is recognising that these market failures may create systematic 
distortions in urban structure.  They can be mitigated by the design of infrastructure policy and 
by rather broad policies of institutional reform and decentralisation.  
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